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Abstract: Why at this particular historical moment has there emerged a rousing inter-
est in the potential contribution of diasporas to the development of migrant sending
states and why is this diaspora turn so pervasive throughout the global South? The
central premise of this paper is that the rapid ascent of diaspora-centred development
cannot be understood apart from historical developments in the West's approach to
governing international spaces. Once predicated upon sovereign power, rule over distant
others is increasingly coming to depend upon biopolitical projects which conspire to dis-
cipline and normalize the conduct of others at a distance so as to create self-reliant and
resilient market actors. We argue that an age of diaspora-centred development has
emerged as a consequence of this shift and is partly constitutive of it. We develop our ar-
gument with reference to Giorgio Agamben's “Homo Sacer” project and in particular the
theological genealogy of Western political constructs he presents in his book The Kingdom
and the Glory (2011). We provide for illustration profiles of three projects which have
played a significant role in birthing and conditioning the current diaspora option: the
World Bank's Knowledge for Development Programme (K4D); the US-based International
Diaspora Engagement Alliance (IdEA); and the EU/UN Joint Migration and Development
Initiative Migration4Development project (JMDI-M4D). Drawing upon economic theol-
ogy, we make a case for construing these projects as elements of the West's emerging
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Introduction
The past decade has witnessed much buzz about a new development panacea:
diaspora-centred development. De Haas (2012) reminds us that from 1945 to the
present, attitudes towards emigration have oscillated between “development
optimism” and “brain drain” pessimism. In a new twist, emigration today is being
recast as a modern and even patriotic act that spawns transnational practices which
furnish countries of origin with “brain gain”, “brain incubation” and “brain circula-
tion” (Faist 2008; Glick Schiller 2012; Kuznetsov 2006, 2013; Leblang 2010; Mercer
et al. 2008; Piper 2009; Saxenian 2006; Sørensen 2014). Once disparaged as
disloyal quitters, deserters and sojourners, migrants are now feted in many sending
states as development actors and benefactors of their homelands. There has
followed a tsunami of interest in the ways that talented and entrepreneurial expatri-
ate communities might transform, improve, scale up, and fortify the capacity and
competitiveness of migrant-sending states and their firms, communities, and
workers. From a position of systematic neglect, according to Gamlen (2014), more
than half of all United Nations member states now have emigrant-focused institu-
tions, diaspora building programmes and policy instruments that are designed to
court and leverage the skills, knowledge, resources and contacts of diasporic com-
munities (see also Agunias and Newland 2012; Boyle and Kitchin 2013; Delano
2014; Gamlen 2008; Ho 2011; Ho and Boyle 2015; Ho et al. 2015a, 2015b; IOM
2013) and even foreign constituencies who share a special affinity and belong to
“elective diasporas” (Ancien et al. 2009; Jöns et al. 2015).
Why at this particular juncture has there emerged a rousing interest in the poten-
tial contribution of diasporas to the development of migrant sending states? Even if
still unevenly engaged and variegated in its manifestations, why is this diaspora
turn gaining traction throughout the global South? Contributing processes are
likely to include globalization and the expansion of the world capitalist economy;
an imaginative new phase of postcolonial nation building; the scale of international
mobility and critical mass of migrant communities; upward mobility and the im-
proved socio-economic status of migrants in some host states; new conversations
between migrants and sending states enabled by revolutionary ICT and transport
technologies; and host state efforts to assuage guilt and recompense for labour
recruitment from the global South by recasting emigration as a development
panacea. It is not our intention to dismiss any of these potential explanations. But
our chosen approach locates the ascent of diaspora-centred development in the
context of wider world historical events and privileges in particular the role of
machinations of Western power in the global South after the age of empire. Our
central argument is that the surfacing of the diaspora option at this historical
moment cannot be understood apart from new articulations between sovereign
power and biopower in the governmental machine of the West.
Our paper aligns with and advances recent research which draws attention to
the political economy of the present diaspora turn. At the heart of this work is
the claim that sending state diaspora engagement strategies are best thought of
as globalizing governmentalities which work for sending states to increase com-
petitive advantage in the neoliberalized globalized economy (Gray 2012; Kalm
2013; Larner 2007; Mohan 2008; Mullings 2011). This insight has prompted
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reflection on the extent to which powerful development actors located in the
global North have played a role in sanctioning and sponsoring the age of dias-
pora-centred development. Pellerin and Mullings (2013) for example suggest that
the diaspora option is becoming a significant feature in development strategies be-
cause it is predicated upon underlying assumptions, ideologies and silences which
are consistent with the “Post-Washington Consensus”. Gamlen (2014) situates the
roots of diaspora-centred development in the emergence of a coherent but
decentralized system of global governance in the area of international migration
(see also Delano and Gamlen 2014). Likewise, Ragazzi (2009, 2012, 2014) calls
for a new focus on the wider material, intellectual and political context, and the
role of organizations such as the OECD, ILO, UN, IOM, UNDP, World Bank, US
State Department and EU, which actively shape the ideologies and practices of mi-
grant-sending states. Sinatti and Horst (2015) also suggest that host countries lo-
cated in the global North promote diaspora-centred development so as to
peddle Western-centric models of government and economy into migrant-sending
states in the global South.
We build our argument with reference to Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben's
“Homo Sacer” project (1995–2015) and in particular the theological genealogy of
Western political constructs he presents in his book The Kingdom and the Glory
(2011). According to Dean (2013:195), The Kingdom and the Glory stands as a “mas-
sive achievement” and presents itself “like a jewel box containing the most perfect,
attentive analyses and the most lapidary of theses”, but he cautions that “the gems”
in this jewel box are to be admired principally for their “uniqueness” and prove to
be “very hard, if not impossible, to apply and use, and to reproduce” (2013:197).
Our intention is to demonstrate that Agamben's gems can indeed be put to pro-
ductive use, in our case to help us better understand the genesis of the age of dias-
pora-centred development. Agamben's point of departure is the claim that
Foucault's genealogy of biopower stops prematurely in the mid-18th century; in
fact, the emergence of biopower can be traced back to early Christian theology.
Whilst Foucault's excavation supports the supposition that both forms of power
are best figured in isolation, Augustinian economic theology draws attention to
the need to understand how sovereign power (an omnipotent god) and biopower
(angelic intermediaries) combine in given historical circumstances to craft providen-
tial design where otherwise there might exist “godless anarchy”. For Agamben,
pace the Holy Trinity, sovereign power and biopower are to be thought of as
“antinomical but functionally” related.
The remainder of the paper is organized into three sections. The next section in-
troduces Agamben's theological genealogy of economy and government, and ex-
cavates the analytics of government he offers in The Kingdom and the Glory. We
then profile three interventions which have played a significant role in the determi-
nation of the current diaspora turn—the World Bank's Knowledge for Development
Programme (K4D), the US-based International Diaspora Engagement Alliance
(IdEA), and the EU/UN Joint Migration and Development Initiative
Migration4Development project (JMDI-M4D)—and note the ways in which they en-
courage sustainable development in countries in the global South by building and
fortifying institutional capacity, active citizens, market actors, and self-reliant and
The Age of Diaspora-Centred Development 579
© 2016 The Author. Antipode © 2016 Antipode Foundation Ltd.
resilient communities. Finally we use Agamben's analytics of government to de-
velop a reading of K4D, IdEA, and JMDI-M4D as elements of the West's economy
of the subject or oikonomia, which work to export to the global South Western po-
litical and economic subjectivities so as to “civilize”, “normalize” and “mainstream”
polities and economies which are perceived to be corrupt, threatening and failing.
Sovereign Power and Biopower: “Antinomical But
Functionally Related”?
Scholarship on state power has ruminated over the status of two competing con-
ceptions of power: a transcendent, juridico-institutional and sovereign paradigm
(“power over”) and an immanent, governmental and biopolitical formulation
(“power to”) (Agamben 2009a). Inspired by Foucault, many scholars claim to
discern a historical shift in favour of the latter since the mid-18th century, at least
in advanced liberal Western states. To them, power, understood as domination over
territory and absolute authority, has ceded to new machinations centred upon the
management of populations through the promotion of new modes of
subjectification. A fresh analytics of government has been called for, one which reg-
isters the importance of governing technes or dispositifs which craft responsible,
self-disciplining, resilient and mainstreamed “active citizens”—in the neoliberal
age, de facto self-reliant market actors. Concomitantly, debate has emerged over
whether this shift applies equally to the actions of states and institutions in the
international arena (Acuto and Curtis 2013; Dean 2007; Depledge 2014; Joseph
2010, 2012, 2014; Larner and Walters 2004). Once predicated upon sovereign
power and brute force, attempts by the West to rule over distant others increasingly
depends upon globalizing governmentalities and biopolitical projects which
remotely discipline, normalize and align conduct. Where once there was colonial
violence, imperialism and neo-colonial puppet regimes, now in addition there are
governing assemblages and networks comprising multiple actors, technologies
and calculative schema (standards, peer review and benchmarks).
Within studies of biopower, there has arisen a tension between those who advo-
cate for hierarchical and top down ontologies on the one hand and those who com-
mit to flat(er) ontologies on the other. Specifically, how best to decide between,
reconcile and/or co-mobilize political economy perspectives and assemblages stud-
ies has proven contentious (Muller 2015). Some scholars foreground the ongoing
importance of political economy, power geometries over the surface of the earth,
and the uneven development of political capacity over space (Brenner et al. 2011;
Joseph 2012). Whilst bringing questions of hegemony and governmentality into
productive conversation, these scholars arguably pay insufficient attention to the
claim that power is rhizomatic, dispersed, decentred and fragmented, a productive
resource exercised by all actors populating networks. Informed by recent attempts
to formulate flat(er) ontologies (Jones et al. 2007; Marston et al. 2005), other
scholars refuse the apparent contradiction between “highly structured assem-
blages” and “unstably heterogeneous assemblages” (McFarlane 2009). Anderson
and McFarlane (2011) and Anderson et al. (2012) focus on the importance of
examining “powerful assemblages” alongside “power in assemblages” (see also
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Allen 2011), and emphasize the ways in which assemblages studies might nourish
and enrich political economy. But there can be a tendency in these studies to
under-contextualize assemblages, take flight from questions of causality, and oc-
clude class relations and the centring presence of hegemons in biopolitical projects.
A particularly sophisticated account of biopower and its relationship to sovereign
power can be found in Giorgio Agamben's “theological genealogy” of Western
political constructs presented in The Kingdom and the Glory: For a Theological
Genealogy of Economy and Government (Agamben 2011, originally published in Ital-
ian in 2007). Agamben's “Homo Sacer” series, of which this book is part,1 constitutes
a highly original exploration of the formative influence of classical, Christian, and
medieval political, economic, legal, and linguistic history, in contemporary forms
of Western power and political theory. In the seminal opening text Homo Sacer: Sov-
ereign Power and Bare Life, Agamben (1995) attends to the ongoing significance of
sovereign power. For Agamben, the exercise of sovereignty by Western states today
renders a “state of exception”, which strips citizens of political status (bio) and de-
grades them to “bare life” (zoë) by placing them outside of law and juridical protec-
tion (see also Agamben 2005). The “camp” is now sovereign power's most
emblematic expression. In contrast, The Kingdom and the Glory, arguably Agamben's
most Foucauldian work, now registers the importance of governmentality and
biopower. Here Agamben brings to the fore indirect rule from a distance through ra-
tionalities, dispositifs and technes of subjectification. But he rejects Foucault's im-
pulse to “cut off the king's head”; his preference is for the maxim “the king rules
but does not govern” (Rabinow and Rose 2006). Both sovereign power and
biopower may be “antinomical” but they are “functionally related”.
In The Kingdom and the Glory, Agamben presents a detailed genealogy of what he
calls “signatures of power” (see also Agamben 2009b). Criticizing Foucault's gene-
alogy of governmentality and biopower for extending back only to the 1700s,
Agamben traces these concepts to Christian theologians from the second to the fifth
century AD. For Agamben, there is much to be gained theoretically and politically
from tracking Western political constructs back to their classical and theological
roots. Archaeological excavations and philological investigations which reach back
to Augustine of Hippo and beyond, render a richer historiography of Western polit-
ical theory and practice. More importantly, the use of allegorical reasoning on the
bases of sacred texts also enlivens our understanding of the machinations of West-
ern power at work both in the West itself and throughout the global South after the
age of empire. Whilst often figured in isolation, if we accept that Trinitarian theol-
ogy has served as a progenitor of Western political philosophy and in particular
conceptions of sovereign power and biopower in Western political theory and prac-
tice, it becomes possible to think anew about the ways in which both forms of
power exist as consubstantial, each implicated in the other.
Agamben contends that the modern dualism between sovereign power and
biopower is but a secularized reworking of the early Christian dualism between
God as transcendent (God as a supernatural being, a Godhead) and God as imma-
nent (God as worldly praxis). This dualism spawned two theological traditions: a
political theology concerned with God as a supreme but detached being, and an
economic theology that reveals God's interventions in worldly affairs. It also birthed
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two paradigms of power, juxtaposed as being and praxis, transcendent and imma-
nent order, father and son, constituent and constituted power, law and the police,
auctoritas and potestas, general providence and special providence, and above all,
reign and government (Agamben 2009a). Early Christian theology toiled to affect
a unity between these two paradigms and theological traditions but found a reso-
lution in Trinitarian theology. God created humans as autonomous beings and un-
derstood the potential for this to create immanent anarchy. Eschatology reminds us
that God retains sovereign power. But he (sic) also intercedes in the world indirectly
using angelic intermediaries to discipline, regulate, and mainstream human behav-
iour so that it aligns with his (sic) divine plan. For Agamben (2011: 141), both forms
of power are consubstantial:
The two levels are strictly entwined, so that the first founds, legitimates, and makes pos-
sible the second, while the second concretely puts into practice in the chain of causes
and effects the general decisions of the divine mind. The government of the world is
what results from this functional correlation.
Whilst Foucault prioritizes the decentred, dispersed and diffuse micro-physics of
biopower, economic theology points to the ongoing proximity of sovereign power
to governmentality and holds that biopower remains in important ways centred, hi-
erarchical and orchestrated power. In making this case Agamben introduces the
concept of oikonomia. Of Greek origin and promulgated by the Roman Empire,
and in contradistinction to the notion polis which refers to the contested gover-
nance of the city, oikonomia refers to the management or administration of the
household (Agamben 2011). He traces the development of this term within early
Christianity and its appropriation into Trinitarian theology. Oikonomia came to be
understood as a form of economy that was less determined than monist economies,
and more determined than the Foucauldian notion of dispositif might imply.
Oikonomic practices work to realize God's divine plan and to establish providential
design on earth. Agamben argues that the sensibility of this concept continues to
be found in the West's governmental machine. Only that it is no longer angels
who serve as intermediaries between the sovereign and the governed, but the
disciplining rationalities, technologies, and modes of subjectification which
comprise the West's oikonomia.
Economic theology calls attention to the role of the aesthetics of oikonomia in the
gathering of convinced believers. Agamben closes The Kingdom and the Glory with
the image of the “empty throne” to capture the puzzling relationship between
power and glory. Given that sheer power is capable of total domination, why
Agamben muses, does it seem that power has an acute need for glory? In fact, glo-
rification, doxology and acclaim are central in the constitution of sovereigns qua sov-
ereigns. But forms of acclamation and doxology change as democratic societies
mature. In the past, God's sovereignty was acclaimed through liturgy and ritual,
and the insignia of monarchical power centred upon ceremony, splendour, crowns,
thrones, and sceptres. Today, under the disapproving gaze of secular democrats, the
significance of these rituals and invented traditions has waned. Yet acclamatory
practices have not gone away. In our heavily mediated society the mass media plays
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a crucial role inmanufacturing consent. It serves as the principal instrument through
which glory is attributed, managed, dispensed and distributed. In the society of the
spectacle, the legitimacy of sovereign power increasingly rests upon the sensational
and celebrity qualities of the oikonomic practices with which it is associated.
Can there be resistance to particular oikonomic practices and if so what form
might such resistance take? For Agamben, sedition is rarely capable of overturning
hegemonic oikonomia. Instead it is most productive when it stands as radically indif-
ferent to, and simply profanes, the logic of these technes of power. We should not
look for revolution but respond to hierarchies and power asymmetries by
deactivating the categories permitting them to function. Agamben uses the concept
of inoperosity to capture what is at stake: the West's governing oikonomia can be
rendered inoperative if populations engage them through cognitive practices which
depart from those originally intended by their architects. Profanation renders
oikonomia inoperative when they systemically ignore their proper or sacred
purpose, creatively play with these purposes, or draw them into alternative secular
uses. The task at hand is to de-sacralize relationships which have been rendered
divine through various types of consecration and to allow these relationships to
be returned to their original use/natural state, or to become means without ends
(Agamben 2007).
We wish to mobilize Agamben's analytics of government to yield insights into the
role of Western power and its changing forms in the ascent of the phenomenon of
diaspora-centred development. We build our argument in two stages. In the next
section we profile three development projects originating in the global North which
have played an important role in bringing the diaspora option to the global South:
the World Bank's Knowledge for Development Programme (K4D); the US-based In-
ternational Diaspora Engagement Alliance (IdEA); and the EU/UN Joint Migration
and Development Initiative Migration4Development project (JMDI-M4D). We note
the ways in which these projects seek to couple diasporas with homelands so as to
build in sending states institutional capacity, fortify market actors, nurture active cit-
izens, and thereafter promote sustainable development. In the section which fol-
lows, pace Agamben, we then contemplate the ways in which economic theology
might enrich our understanding of these projects. We consider the implications of
thinking of sovereign power and biopower as antinomical but functionally related;
interpreting K4D, IdEA, and JMDI-M4D as elements in the West's providential
oikonomia. Whilst galvanizing an acclaiming public in the global South by mobiliz-
ing an aesthetic based on spectacle, heroes and celebrity, these oikonomic practices
are also routinely gamed or profaned and frequently rendered inoperative.
Building Sustainable Development in the Global South:
The Discovery of the Diaspora Option
Oriented by policy dogmas which have been labelled the Washington Consensus,
for some time now the international development sector has focused its attention
on macro-economic reform in countries in the global South. Underdevelopment,
it is argued, is a product of corrupt polities and institutional weakness and failure;
the solution is to erect Western style institutional architectures which are guarantors
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of basic economic and political freedoms; transparent, accountable and
underpinned by the rule of law; and predicated upon appropriate incentive struc-
tures. But alongside these macro-economic corrections, and inspired in part by de-
bate on the need for a Post-Washington Consensus, the international development
community has also sought to catalyse development by building the capacity of the
peoples of the global South; enhancing the social capital of communities, building
the skills of workers, activating citizens, and promoting the competiveness of mar-
ket actors. The prevailing political economy has been assumed as a given; the pre-
scription has been to equip the poor to better compete.
It is against this backdrop that the current enthusiasm for the diaspora option is to
be understood. Overseas citizens are an asset or tool to be used by sending states as
a source of competitive advantage. In addition to well established contributions
(through remittances, philanthropy, tourist visits, the consumption of “nostalgia
goods”, voluntarism, and circular and return migration), migrant communities
are now to be engaged as investors, mentors, sources of knowledge, brokers, and
lobbyists. Sending states are being encouraged to develop a series of policy initia-
tives—diaspora strategies—to better convene, leverage, harness, and fortify their re-
lationships with well positioned, resourceful and “ethnopreneurial” expatriate
communities. Complimenting the emerging Post-Washington Consensus, diaspora
strategies are to buttress the capacity and competitiveness of sending states and
their firms, communities, and workers. The overall objective is the integration of
countries in the global South into the global capitalist economy and the promotion
of self-sustaining, self-reliant, and resilient development.
To illuminate this claim we now place under scrutiny three development projects
originating in the global North which have played an important role in bringing the
diaspora option to the global South: K4D, IdEA, and JMDI-M4D. The aims, objec-
tives, and methodologies of each differ. The K4D programme focuses on building
diaspora knowledge networks by bridging diaspora elites with better performing
institutions in the homeland. IdEA seeks to tie diaspora-centred development to
US foreign policy and courts diaspora constituencies with complimentary ideolog-
ical leanings. Occupied with “managed migration”, JMDI-M4D builds the social,
cultural, economic, and political capital of small-scale actors by mobilizing and
connecting local and regional governments in both host and destination countries.
The end goal though is the same in each case, namely to reconstitute the relationship
between diasporas and homelands so as to build the resilience of institutions, com-
munities, citizens, and market actors in the global South so that they become self-
reliant, responsible, and self-sustaining—at least according to Western standards.
The World Bank's Knowledge for Development Programme
(K4D)
The World Bank's K4D programme can be traced to the Bank's response to wide-
spread critiques of the macro-economic stability (and austerity) programmes or
structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) it visited upon debt-ridden countries in
the global South from the 1980s. In 1996 the new President of the Bank, James
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Wolfensohn, launched a comprehensive development framework (CDF) to recast
the Bank's approach towards international development. The CDF comprised two
main initiatives; poverty reduction strategies (PRSs) and the K4D programme. The
main objective of the K4D programme is to build the capacity of client countries
(mainly in the global South) by furnishing them with “development knowledge”,
directly by drawing upon the Bank's development experience (it reframed itself as
a “knowledge bank”) and indirectly by mobilizing knowledge brokers from the de-
velopment industry in the global North. Client countries would assume ownership
over their development and become, at least from the perspective of the Bank,
more autonomous, self-reliant, and resilient market actors. Whilst the CDF pre-
sented itself as an abrupt departure from the macro-economic adjustment
programmes of the past, the Bank continues to be wedded to a neoliberal model
of development. The K4D programme is both aligned to and consistent with the
Post-Washington Consensus.
At the heart of the K4D programme are the Knowledge Economy Framework
(KEF) and the Knowledge Assessment Methodology (KAM). The KEF identifies four
factors that combine to determine the knowledge resources of a country: (1) the
prevailing economic and institutional regime; (2) the quality, education, and skill
of the workforce; (3) the status of ICT infrastructure; and (4) the domestic innova-
tion ecosystem. KAM is a tool that provides an assessment of countries’ and regions’
readiness for the knowledge economy through comparison with their peers. Orga-
nized around the four key factors identified in the KEF, KAM incorporates 148 KPI
variables and provides measures for 146 countries. A variety of KAM scorecards
are provided, including a Knowledge Economy Index (KEI) which assesses the ex-
tent to which countries are producing, accessing, disseminating and adopting
knowledge relevant to their development.
To help client countries address deficits registered in KAM scorecards, the World
Bank Institute launched a Skills and Innovation Policy (SIP) programme that provides
analytical reports and distils pertinent “development knowledge” for client coun-
tries. The SIP programme prioritized five key themes, among which is “Diasporas
of Highly Skilled and Migration of Talent”. The Bank has long recognized that dias-
poras contribute to the development of countries of origin through remittances
and volunteerism. But inspired by Saxenian's (2006) pioneering work on ethnic
communities in Silicon Valley—Chinese, Indian, Taiwanese, Israeli, andmore recently
Armenian—that leverage social and business webs to promote development in their
respective “homelands”, it is their role in enhancing the knowledge base of countries
of origin that has prompted new directions. Starting with projects in El Salvador, the
Bank first became involved in pilot initiatives in Argentina, Armenia, Chile, Mexico,
and South Africa (Kuznetsov 2006). More recently, in conjunctionwith theMcArthur
Foundation and the Migration Policy Institute, it has explored the ways in which
talent abroad has acted to transform domestic institutions and build indigenous
capacity in Mexico, Russia, India, South Korea, and Argentina (Kuznetsov 2013).
The Bank rejects generalized appeals to diasporas, speculative partner search
calls, and support for amorphous diaspora cultural and business networks as
largely ineffective (Kuznetsov 2013). Instead it prefers to partner elite diaspora indi-
viduals with decisive and critical knowledge and high performing institutions and
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actors in sending states who are well placed to use this knowledge (Kuznetsov
2013). A small number of high-level expatriates can make a significant difference
when they serve as “antennas”, detecting entrepreneurial and dynamic segments
of domestic institutions; as “search networks” to identify ongoing constraints in
these institutions, finding solutions, and mobilizing expertise; and as “Archimedean
levers”, bridging the competencies of the diaspora with more promising domestic
institutions (Kuznetsov 2013).
According to the Bank, the case of Global Scot, an elite diaspora business network
established by Scottish Development International to support the globalization of
SMEs from Scotland, provides a good example of how to build special purpose net-
works. The Bank has sought to replicate this model in Chile (Chile Global), Mexico
(Red de Talentos), South Africa (Global South Africa), and Argentina (Mendoza
Emprende). The Bank's celebrated story is of the contribution made by Chilean ap-
plied geneticist Ramón L. García to the Chilean agribusiness sector. After securing a
PhD from the University of Iowa, García achieved success as a biotechnology entre-
preneur and co-founded InterLink Biotechnologies, a company located in Princeton,
NJ. In 1977, inspired by his roots and wishing to exploit opportunity costs, García
contacted Fundación Chile, a Chilean private–public entity responsible for encour-
aging technology transfer into Chile. Their joint projects helped transfer to Chile
technologies crucial to its continued competitiveness in the agribusiness sector.
The US-based International Diaspora Engagement Alliance
(IdEA)
In 2010, the US Department of State and USAid launched a cost cutting Quadrennial
Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR). Other than a strong military for de-
fence, there is now new emphasis upon diplomacy and development, or what then
Secretary of State Hilary Clinton variously labelled “smart power”, “civilian power”,
and “21st century statecraft”. The first QDDR restructured the Foreign Service, mak-
ing ambassadors and heads of mission the coordinators of the work of all US govern-
ment departments in each client country and responsible for value for money
assessments of USAid projects. Guided by a new “USAid Forward” strategy and led
by USAid's Administrator Rajiv Shah, USAidwas to cut back on subcontracting devel-
opment programmes to third-party intermediaries and to deal directly with develop-
ment actors in client countries. Alongside providing resources for development, the
Department of State was now to leverage the resources of public, private, and civil
society partnerships in these countries (US State Department 2010).
Against this backdrop, in May 2011, at the instruction of Hilary Clinton, the Global
Partnership Initiative, in collaboration with USAid and the Migration Policy Institute,
hosted the first Global Diaspora Forum and inaugurated a new, US-based interna-
tional diaspora engagement alliance (IdEA), which claims to be “a non-partisan,
non-profit organization that engages global diaspora communities, the private sector,
civil society, and public institutions in collaborative efforts to support economic and
social development”. In 2014, The Department of State and USAid enlisted the US-
based Calvert Foundation, a Community Development Financial Institution, as a co-
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partner in IdEA to administer this initiative. IdEA has also entered into strategic partner-
ships with The Hand Foundation, One Vietnam, Boom Financial and Western Union,
and programme-specific partnerships with Digicel, Scotia Bank, OPIC, International
Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), Inter American Investment Bank, Mentor
Cloud, Global Giving, New America Media, and Global Entrepreneurship Week.
Initially IdEA promoted partnership building for diaspora-centred development in
five areas: (1) diaspreneuership, encouraging diaspora entrepreneurs to invest in
enterprises and stimulate trade in countries of origin; (2) diasplomacy, strengthen-
ing the existing role of diasporas in diplomacy, advocacy, and peace building, in-
cluding using non-traditional vehicles such as sports, arts, and culture; (3)
diasporacorps, incubating diaspora volunteerism in countries of origin; (4) diaspora
2.0, fostering innovative ICT technologies to enhance connectivity to the homeland;
and (5) diasphilanthropy, encouraging the diaspora to donate to areas of educa-
tion, health, nutrition, and disaster relief. More recently it reorganized its activities
around four new pillars: investment and entrepreneurship; philanthropy; volun-
teerism; and innovation. Currently, IdEA works by convening partners and facilitat-
ing networking opportunities for diasporas, private sector, non-profit and
government partners; mobilizing resources and enabling diasporas to gain access
to new resources through IdEA partnerships; connecting diaspora members to
business competitions such as Fish 2.0, the African Diaspora Marketplace and the
Caribbean Idea Marketplace; developing capacity by offering technical assistance
and training; and implementing projects, together with its partners.
IdEA bears the stamp of US philosophy and mission concerning the provision of
development assistance and aid to countries in the global South. It is in the interests
of the US to support migrants to reach back to their countries of origin to help these
homelands become peaceable liberal democracies with functioning market econo-
mies which pose little threat to US and provide new market opportunities. In an
opening statement at the first meeting of the Global Diaspora Forum in
Washington during 2011 Hilary Clinton said:
The truth is that it's not possible for any government, no matter how well meaning, to
meet the challenges we face, from natural disasters, to economic stagnation, to poverty
or civil unrest. Therefore, we need what I call smart power, and that means employing
every tool at our disposal. Building these coalitions, spurring initiative and innovation
around the world, using people-to-people exchanges is actually the core of smart
power. Because of your familiarity with cultural norms, your own motivations, your
own special skills and leadership, you are, frankly, our Peace Corps, our USAID, our
OPIC, our State Department all rolled into one.
In 2015 under the stewardship of new Secretary of State John Kerry, the US State
Department published a second Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review
(QDDR), which elevated development and diplomacy to equal status alongside
defence and security. This second review set forth four strategic priorities: (1)
preventing and mitigating conflict and violent extremism; (2) promoting open,
resilient, and democratic societies; (3) advancing inclusive economic growth by
“expanding the middle class worldwide”; and (4) tackling climate change and its
consequences (US State Department 2015). At the third meeting of the Global
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Diaspora forum in Washington during 2015, Secretary of State Kerry reiterated the
ongoing role of immigrants in delivering this agenda for the US:
More than 60 million Americans are first or second generation. They are members of
strong and vibrant diaspora communities—communities who have strong linkages to
other nations but for whom America is now home. I have said time and again that
foreign policy begins at home with private businesses, religious and community orga-
nizations, and private citizens. It should be no surprise that our diaspora communities
are one of our most important resources. They're our people-to-people ambassadors
to far-away places and uniquely help bridge both geographic and cultural divides …
There is even more that all these communities can contribute to America's foreign
policy—helping us reorient our ties to diverse corners of the globe, helping US fuel
economic growth and prosperity.
The EU/UN Joint Migration and Development Initiative
Migration4Development Project (JMDI-M4D)
The European Union's approach to international development has undergone
significant reform since the establishment of the EuropeAid External Cooperation
Office (AIDCO) in 2001. In 2011, AIDCO merged with the Directorate General
for Development and Relations with the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific to form
Development and Cooperation—EuropeAid. That same year, the European Com-
mission adopted the “Agenda for Change Communication” to advance goals
concerning human rights, democracy and good governance, and inclusive and
sustainable growth in international aid programmes. Agenda for Change em-
phasized capacity building in poor and middle income countries so that these
countries might take ownership over their development trajectories and become
self-regulating and resilient market actors. In 2015, the European Commission
created a new Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Develop-
ment with responsibility to oversee the Commission's external relations and
development policies.
The principal funds which the EU uses to promote international development are
the European Development Fund (EDF), the Development Cooperation Instrument
(DCI), the Instrument for pre-Accession, and European Neighbourhood Instrument.
After the EDF, the DCI is the second-largest fund. The DCI has presided over five the-
matic programmes, one of which is on “cooperation in the area of migration and
asylum”. The programme unfolded from 2007 to 2013 and aimed to support third
countries in fostering links between migration and development, overseeing labour
migration, preventing and curbing irregular migration, facilitating the readmission
of illegal immigrants, and protecting the most vulnerable from exploitation and
exclusion. As a reflection of its emphases upon reducing migration to the EU, it
focused upon two neighbouring source regions: “the South” includes the Middle
East, southern Mediterranean (Northern Africa) and sub-Saharan Africa, and “the
East” includes Central Asia and Eastern Europe (also the southern Caucasus). But
it also prioritized migrant-sending regions such as the Caribbean, Latin America,
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the Pacific region as well as South, South-East and East Asia. In 2014 this
programme was subsumed under a new thematic priority titled the “Global Public
Goods and Challenges” programme.
The EU/UN JMDI-M4D project emerged from the 2007–2013 thematic
programmes. JMDI-M4D has developed over two distinctive phases. Phase 1
(2008–2012) was funded by the European Commission but coordinated by
the UNDP. It called for competitive grant applications to run projects (total
value of 15 million Euros) that fortify the contribution of diasporic populations
to the development of their countries of origin. Phase 2 (2012–2016) sought
to identify and capitalize on a limited number of successful initiatives from the
first phase. This phase has been carried forward at the behest of the European
Commission by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, increas-
ingly in partnership with the IOM, ILO, UNHCR, UNFPA, UN Women, and
UNITAR. JMDI-M4D deploys a multi-stakeholder approach encompassing civil so-
ciety and other local actors (chambers of commerce, private sector, universities,
community groups, diaspora lobby groups, aid agencies, charities, etc.). It also
draws on the experience of local authority networks; for example JMDI-M4D
works closely with the UNDP Art Gold programme (which deals with local
governance and local development).
JMDI-M4D's central claim is that decentralized diaspora strategies that build
partnerships between local governments and local civil society organizations in
both origin and destination countries will prove most successful and enduring
in stemming the flow of migration by building the capacity of sending states
as self-reliant and resilient actors in the globalized economy. Small-scale stake-
holders (such as local and regional authorities) in European host states and
migrant-sending states were invited to bid for competitive grants to implement
initiatives designed to: (1) set up and reinforce networks of actors working on
migration and development; (2) identify good practices in the field and share in-
formation on what works at the local and international level; and (3) feed grass-
roots wisdom back to national and international policymakers. Fifty-one projects
across 16 countries in the global South were funded. Priority was given to initia-
tives that are already part of local strategic and national plans; in regions with
high emigration rates, large immigrant populations or transitory migrant flows;
and which address age and gender inequalities. JMDI-M4D has redefined
European attitudes to diaspora-centred development through a handbook for
practitioners, exemplars of best practice, practical toolkits, a discussion forum
and blog, and hosting icebreaker events and practitioner networking conferences
(JMDI 2011).
Phase 1 of JMDI-M4D sought to build four sets of “capital” in migrant commu-
nities: social, financial, human, and cultural capital. Social capital refers to the ex-
tent, density, and capacity of migrants’ social networks, not least their various
connections with communities at home. For example, JMDI-M4D funded a joint
project between the Mona School of Business in Jamaica and the Kajans
Women's Social and Arts Enterprise in the UK, which created an online commu-
nity dedicated to improving policymaking and development planning in Jamaica.
Financial capital denotes putting the economic resources of migrants to
The Age of Diaspora-Centred Development 589
© 2016 The Author. Antipode © 2016 Antipode Foundation Ltd.
productive use for both the migrant and the sending country. One such project
is the tripartite link between Unlad Kabayan Migrant Services Foundation Inc.
and the Migrant Forum in Asia, both located in the Philippines, and the
Netherlands-based Commission for Filipino Migrant Workers initiative, which
channels remittances towards personal savings and community development.
Human capital is associated with migrants’ education, skills, talents, and compe-
tencies that might be transferred directly and indirectly to serve homeland labour
markets. An example is the partnership between the Egyptian Agribusiness Asso-
ciation and the Athens Network of Collaborating Experts, which facilitates the de-
velopment of the aquaculture and fisheries industries in Egypt. Finally, cultural
capital refers to migrants’ awareness of rights—in both sending and destination
states—that might enhance their capacity to transfer ideas and values back home.
An example is the collaboration between the Algerian Forum for Citizenship and
Modernity and the Region of Sicily to provide migrants with “pre-departure”
warnings and advice.
Towards an Agambenian Rendering of the Age
Diaspora-Centred Development
We nowwish to draw upon the Agambenian analytics of government set out above
to offer a reading of the rise of the age of diaspora-centred development which is
attentive to economic theology and its interpretation of the interplay between sov-
ereign power and biopower. We begin by posing the question, what kinds of power
do projects such as K4D, IdEA, and JMDI-M4D embody? On the one hand these
projects are conceived by and operate in the shadow of powerful sovereign states
such as the US State Department or organizations that exercise aspects of sover-
eignty like the World Bank and the European Union.2 But in so far as they govern
indirectly by mobilizing and disciplining biosocial collectivities held together by cat-
egories such as “diaspora”, “nation”, “ethnicity”, “religion”, and “citizen”, they
posture as acts of biopower. Approaching sovereign power and biopower as
antimonical but functionally related, we submit that projects such as K4D, IdEA,
and JMDI-M4D are in fact best understood as elements in the West's providential
oikonomia or oikonomic practices which work to (re)produce Western political
and economic subjectivities in the global South, “administering the house” in the
image of the West.
Agamben's insistence that sovereign power and biopower are to be thought to-
gether proves helpful in understanding why projects like K4D, IdEA, and JMDI-
M4D have arisen at this particular historical moment. Our world has been shaped
by centuries of Western imperialism and hegemony. In the postcolonial era, West-
ern nations have presided over a series of nefarious “new” colonial and neo-colonial
projects or military misadventures. Today, their hegemonic status continues to be
complicated and threatened by a volatile and changing geopolitical landscape. In
pursuit of ongoing dominance, Western institutions are relying on biopower and
rule through assemblages which discipline distant subjects, but in so doing their
ambitions are no less hegemonic. Biopolitical projects prove to be effective to a sig-
nificant degree because they are enacted by states which retain formidable
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sovereign power. Pace Augustine's Trinitarian theology and to paraphrase
Agamben, it is the West's hard power which founds, legitimates and makes possible
biopolitical projects such as K4D, IdEA, and JMDI-M4D, but it is also biopolitical pro-
jects such as these that put into practice the chain of causes and operationalizes the
influence of the Western sovereign. In short, the king rules but does not govern.
The biopolitical power wielded by initiatives such as K4D, IdEA, and JMDI-M4D is
issued from the sovereign power of their architects, namely the World Bank, the
US State Department and the EU, without which these initiatives might easily be ig-
nored. That they are taken seriously and have had significant traction in the world
underscores the claim that the progenitor matters.
Projects like K4D, IdEA, and JMDI-M4D constitute a new breed of mission
civilisatrice. They embody a number of Western epistemes, rationalities, mentalities,
and visualizations which work to civilize “unruly”, “corrupt”, “rogue”, and “failing
states” in the global South by bringing to bear Western prescriptions of order. At
one level, any kind of self-sustaining development will do; since events in these
states are likely to rebound on the West, it is important to mitigate security risks,
manage migration and refugee flows, and relax pressure on overstretched aid bud-
gets. But at a deeper level, projects like K4D, IdEA, and JMDI-M4D conflate
“capacity building” and “institution building” with “Westernisation”. Capitalist
modernity becomes seamlessly associated with “development” and other ideas
such as “order”, “modernization”, “progress”, and “civilization”. By exporting
the West's formula for successful development, countries of the global South can
be set on the “correct” pathway to prosperity. Only by allowing themselves to be
open to Western political and economic subjectivities and “normalized”,
“corrected”, and “aligned” will “primitive”, “malfunctioning”, and “corrupt”
global South institutions be made fit for purpose.
It is erroneous to assume that because institutions in advanced liberal states such
as the World Bank, the US State Department Government, and the EU increasingly
operate through a looser and more fragmented collection of actors and networks
that their power is somehow weakened. Biopower works in close proximity to key
loci of sovereign power and it remains a stretch to say that power is being substan-
tially “off sited” and flattened. Certainly, K4D, IdEA, and JMDI-M4D convene assem-
blages which are disparate, comprising inter alia: ministries, ministers,
departments, firms, and NGOs within powerful Western host states; immigrant
and emigrant fraternities, clubs, associations, networks, chambers of commerce,
media, charities, and foundations; sending state ministries, ministers, NGOs,
community organizations, firms, and diaspora engagement vehicles; scorecards,
KPI indices, platforms for sharing best practices, policy briefs, toolkits, competitive
grants, and peer review; and a surging academic and private consultancy industry.
But these “knots” interact with each other in highly structured ways as a reflection
of uneven geographical development and historically ingrained global power
asymmetries. Because they are part of the West's oikonomia, the morphology,
and modus operandi of these assemblages are best apprehended to a significant
extent as centred, structured, hierarchical, and asymmetric.
To a degree, K4D, IdEA, and JMDI-M4D have gained traction in the global South
and gathered convinced believers because they present themselves through an
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aesthetic based on spectacle, celebrity (the “hero migrant”) and unbridled possibil-
ities. Key to this is a sleight of hand permitting Western institutions to export West-
ern ideologies by proxy to the global South. Governing from afar through
oikonomia predicated upon spectacle exploits a productive gap for Western institu-
tions and Western ideas: ethnopreneurial kin serve as effective bearers of Western
recipes for success because they seem culturally proximate, cognitively accessible,
less vested in securing Western interests, and more concerned with the wellbeing
of their homelands and caring for intimate kin. The hero migrant is a more adept
interlocutor of Western development models than Western technocrats or evangel-
ical politicians; the stories of high-achieving celebrities, billionaire relatives, and
esteemed co-nationals and co-ethnics prove more seductive and compelling to
public opinion and more easily galvanize an acclaiming public.
But all sacred oikonomia can be rendered inoperative, through profanation. In the
present context profanation can arise when actors and stakeholders allow them-
selves to be drawn into ruling assemblages but render these assemblages inopera-
tive by performing alternative registers. Projects such as K4D, IdEA, and JMDI-M4D
are in fact routinely profaned when migrant-sending states make positive gestures
towards them but mobilize diaspora communities to serve other institutions, mo-
tives, and agendas; when migrant communities engage with these projects but
only to procure resources for their fraternities and associations; or when migrants
capture and exploit these projects and the weight of their parent organizations,
namely the World Bank, the US State Department, and the EU, to enhance their
own political agendas and economic interests in countries of origin. Insights into
how profanation might prove to be progressive can be found in Ho et al.'s (2015)
call for a new generation of diaspora strategies which is informed by feminist care
ethics, rather than essentially pragmatic and utilitarian relationships. By de-
consecrating Western attempts to degrade and instrumentalize diaspora–home-
land relationships, it may even be possible to “free” these relationships so that they
become means without ends, with intrinsic value in and of themselves.
Conclusion
In his 2015 book The Use of Bodies, the finale to the “Homo Sacer” series, Agamben
refuses the possibility of a capstone synthesis, concluding that philosophical works
can only be “abandoned (and perhaps continued by others)” (Agamben 2015:5).
In part a response to this provocation, this paper has mobilized the analytics of gov-
ernment set forth in his earlier book The Kingdom and the Glory (2011) to venture an
explanation of the diaspora turn which is presently capturing the international de-
velopment agenda and spawning a tidal wave of “diaspora strategies” in migrant
sending states throughout the global South. We have argued that Agamben's theo-
logical genealogy of the Western political imaginary helps us think anew about the
co-constitution of sovereign power and biopower in the governmental machine of
the West. We have claimed that the ascent of the age of diaspora-centred develop-
ment cannot be understood apart from historical developments in the way the West
seeks to rule over international space. Informed by Augustine's economic theology,
we have focused upon the proximity of Western sovereigns to acts of biopower
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using as case studies the World Bank's K4D, the US-based IdEA, and the EU/UN
JMDI-M4D projects. Our Agambenian rendering of the diaspora turn has allowed
us to think about the functional relationship between sovereign power and
biopower in these projects, the role they play as Western oikonomic instruments af-
ter the age of empire, the ways in which they gather believers by attending to an
aesthetic of spectacle, and the extent to which they are vulnerable to profanation
and inoperosity.
We conclude by calling attention to the need to interrogate more expansively the
complex and variegated articulations of sovereign power and biopower over time
and space than has been possible here. First, there is a need to be alert to the
paradoxical ways in which Western sovereign power can work to eclipse and usurp
Western biopolitical projects. Here we need to juxtapose our analysis with
Agamben's earlier interpretations of the “state of exception” and of “bare life”.
Nye (2004) disaggregates what he calls “smart power” into traditional “hard
power” and “soft power” only to argue that in the US and the EU hard power is
now in the ascendancy and that the balance between both types of power needed
to secure smart power is lacking. This assertion speaks to the draconian strategies
currently securitizing migration from Africa and the Middle East to Europe's
Mediterranean states, and also Mexican migration to the United States, which
appear to be not only antinomical but also dysfunctionally related to projects such
as K4D, IdEA, and JMDI-M4D. Second, by taking more seriously flat(er) ontologies
and claims of decentred and distributed power, it might be possible to examine more
carefully the ways in which processes of composition, instability, heterogeneity and
multiplicity in governing assemblages can frustrate the intended outcomes of
biopolitical projects and complicate the ambition of hegemons. Here, what is needed
is a political economy framing of projects such as K4D, IdEA, and JMDI-M4D which is
capable of tolerating the claim that all actors in assemblages, however minoritized,
are vital, lively, unpredictable and causative; threatening always, through profanation
but also other forms of resistance, to over-spill power (Philo 2012).
Finally, whilst this latest tradition of mission civilisatrice finds its primary audi-
ence in migrant-sending states, it also carries important implications for migrants.
Recent research points to the stubborn persistence of established policy frames in
the US and some European countries that seek to repress migration inflows and
promote security-orientated migration policy (Keijzer et al. 2016; Kleist 2014).
Projects such as K4D, IdEA, and JMDI-M4D recast the terms of hospitality which
host countries extend to migrant communities by elevating expectations of loyalty
and commitment. Against the backdrop of waning enthusiasm for multicultural-
ism and the rise of far right politics and xenophobia, these projects risk becoming
yet another citizenship test that migrants need to pass if they are to be accepted
as trusted members of their new communities. It may be then that profanation is
to be fought on two fronts, a primary site in migrant-sending states where
imported models of government and economy are now attempting to find their
feet and a secondary site in host countries where migrant groups are being
conscripted to serve the interests of the exporters of these models and in so doing
are falling prey to what Derrida (in Derrida and Dufourmantelle 2000) has termed
a new politics of hospitality.
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Endnotes
1 The series was written across a 20-year period (1995–2015) and comprises eight volumes.
Although published out of sequence and in noway linear, Agamben arranges the books into
four categories: (1) Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life; (2.1) State of Exception; (2.2)
Stasis: Civil War as a Political Paradigm; (2.3) The Sacrament of Language: An Archeology of the
Oath; (2.4) The Kingdom and the Glory: For a Theological Genealogy of Economy and Glory;
(2.5)OpusDei: An Archeology of Duty; (3) Remnants of Auschwitz: TheWitness and the Archive;
(4.1) The Highest Poverty: Monastic Rules and Form-of-Life; and finally (4.2) The Use of Bodies.
The Kingdom and the Glory, then, represents a mid-way point in the wider project.
2 We refer to the World Bank and European Union as sovereign like to emphasize their
capacity to enforce sanctions stemming from their constitutive embeddedness within the
system of Western sovereign states.
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